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Abstract : Financial crises are often associated with an endogenous credit reversal, followed
by a fall in asset prices and serious disruptions in the nancial sector. To account for this
sequence of events, this paper constructs a model where excessive risk-taking by investors
leads to a bubble in asset prices, and where the supply of credit to these investors is endoge-
nous. We show that the interplay between excessive risk-taking and the endogeneity of credit
may give rise to multiple equilibria associated with di¤erent levels of lending, asset prices,
and output. Stochastic equilibria lead, with positive probability, to an ine¢ cient liquidity
dry-up, a market crash, and widespread failures by borrowers. The possibility of multiple
equilibria and self-fullling crises is shown to be related to the severity of the risk-shifting
problem in the economy.
Keywords: Credit market imperfections; self-fullling expectations; nancial crises.
JEL codes: G12; G33.
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1 Introduction
The resurgence of nancial crises over the past twenty years, both in OECD and developing
countries, has sparked renewed interest in the potential sources of nancial fragility and
market imperfections from which they originate. Although each crisis had, of course, its
own particular features, it is now widely agreed that many of them were characterised by
a common underlying pattern of destabilising developments in credit and asset markets.
Amongst OECD countries in the 1980s and early 1990s, such as Japan or the Scandinavian
countries, nancial crises were an integral part of a broader credit cyclewhereby nancial
deregulation led to an increase in available credit, fuelled a period of overinvestment in real
estate and stock markets, and led to high asset-price ination. These events were then
followed by a credit contraction (or crunch) and the bursting of the asset bubble, causing
the actual or near bankruptcy of the nancial institutions which had initially levered the
asset investment1. A similar sequence of events has been observed in a number of Asian
and Latin American countries, where capital account liberalisation allowed large amounts of
capital to ow in during the 1990s, with a similar e¤ect of raising asset prices to unsustainable
levels. This phase of overlending often ended in a brutal capital account reversal followed
by a market crash and a banking crisis.2
An important theoretical issue, as yet largely unanswered, is whether the credit turn-
around that typically accompanies nancial crises is the outcome of an autonomous, extrin-
sic, reversal of expectations on the part of economic agents, or simply the natural outcome
of accumulated macroeconomic imbalances or policy mistakes, i.e., the intrinsic fundamen-
tals of the economy. For a time, the consensus was to interpret crises simply as the outcome
of extraneous sunspotshitting the beliefs of investors, regardless of the underlying fun-
damental soundness of the economy. For example, early models of crises would emphasise
the inherent instability of the banking system, whose provision of liquidity insurance made
banks sensitive to self-fullling runs, as the ultimate source of vulnerability to crises3. In
a similar vein, second-generationmodels of currency crises would insist on the potential
1See Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994) and Allen and Gale (1999, 2000), as well as the references therein,
for a more detailed account of these events.
2See Calvo (1998), Kaminsky (1999) and Kaminsky and Rheinart (1998, 1999) for the evidence on this
sequence of events, often referred to as sudden stop.
3See Diamond and Dybvig (1983), as well as Chang and Velasco (2002) for an open-economy model.
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existence of multiple equilibria in models of exchange rate determination, where the defense
of a pre-announced peg by the central bank is too costly to be fully credible4.
Although such expectational factors certainly play a rôle in triggering nancial crises,
theories based purely on self-fullling expectations clearly do not tell the full story. In
virtually all the recent episodes brieymentioned above, specic macroeconomic or structural
sources of fragility preceded the actual occurrence of the crisis. In OECD countries, for
example, nancial crises usually followed periods of loose monetary policy or poor exchange-
rate management (e.g., Borio et al., 1994). In emerging countries, the culprit was often to be
found in the weakness of the banking sector, due to poor nancial regulation, as well as other
factors such as unsustainable scal or exchange rate policies (Summers, 2000). Overall, the
evidence from this latter group of countries indicates that factors of fundamental weakness
explain only some of the probability of a crisis, suggesting that both fundamental and non-
fundamental elements are at work in triggering nancial crises (see Kaminsky, 1999, and the
discussion in Chari and Kehoe, 2003).
The model of nancial crises that we develop below aims to account for both the credit-
asset price cycle typical of recent crises and the joint role of fundamental and nonfundametal
factors in making crises possible. In so doing, we draw on Allen and Gale (2000), for whom
nancial crises are the natural outcome of credit relations where portfolio investors borrow to
buy risky assets, and are protected against bad payo¤ outcomes by the use of debt contracts
with limited liability. Investorsdistorted incentives then lead them to overinvest in risky
assets (i.e., a risk-shifting problem arises), whose price consequently rises to high levels
(leading to an asset bubble), with the possibility that investors go bankrupt if asset payo¤s
turn out badly (a nancial crisis occurs). Unlike Allen and Gale, however, who study
the risk-shifting problem in isolation and make the partial-equilibrium assumption that the
amount of funds available to investors is exogenous, we allow for endogenous variations
in the supply of credit resulting from lenders utility-maximising behaviour. We regard
this alternative specication as not only more realistic, but also particularly relevant to
our understanding of recent crises episodes, where the endogeneity of aggregate credit was
frequently identied as being an important source of nancial instability5.
Our results indicate that the interdependence between excessive risk-taking by investors
4E.g., Obsfeld (1996) and Velasco (1996).
5See, for example, Edison, Luangaram and Miller (2000) for a contribution representative of this view.
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and the elasticity of aggregate credit is indeed a serious factor of endogenous instability.
First, we show that, under risk-shifting, the equilibrium return that lenders expect from
lending to investors may be non-monotonic and increase with the aggregate quantity of
loans, rather than decrease, as standard marginal productivity arguments would suggest.
The explanation is that investors optimal portfolio composition typically changes as the
amount of funds that is lent to them varies, i.e., the assetsand liabilitiessides of investors
balance-sheets are not independent. In certain circumstances, which we derive and explain
in the paper, an increase in investors liabilities may increase the share of safe assets in
their portfolios, which tends to raise the ex ante return on loans. When strong enough, this
portfolio compositione¤ect may dominate the usual marginal productivitye¤ect, so that
the expected return on loans increases with aggregate loans (for some range of total loans at
least). This strategic complementarity naturally leads to the existence of multiple equilibria
associated with di¤erent levels of aggregate lending, asset prices, and output. We relate
the intensity of these strategic complementarities, and the resulting possibility of multiple
equilibria, to the severity of the risk-shifting problem in the economy.
We then consider the case where multiple equilibria do exist, and where the selection
of an equilibrium with low lending follows a sunspot, i.e., an extraneous signal of any
ex ante probability on which agents coordinate their expectations. We show that such
stochastic equilibria generate self-fullling crises with the following characteristics; i) lending
to portfolio investors drops o¤as lenders choose to consume or store, rather than lend, a large
share of their endowment (credit contraction), ii) this causes a fall in investorsresources
and a drop in their demand for xed-supply assets, whose price consequently falls to low
levels (market crash), and iii) this fall in prices forces into bankruptcy investors who had
previously borrowed to buy assets, as the new value of their assets falls short of their liabilities
(nancial sector disruptions). In short, weak fundamentals make multiple equilibria possible,
while self-fullling expectations trigger the actual occurrence of the crisis. We also provide
a full welfare analysis of the model. Crises are shown to unambiguously decrease ex ante
welfare, with a principal source of this welfare loss being the negative wealth e¤ects of the
crash on lendersconsumption levels.
Although our theory of nancial crises draws on recent related contributions, it also di¤ers
from them in several dimensions. While Allen and Gale (2000) and Edison et al. (2000)
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both emphasise the interdepency between asset price movements and aggregate credit during
crises, they do so in the framework of single-equilibrium models where crises are entirely
explained by exogenous fundamentals. Building on the empirical results of Kaminsky (1999)
discussed above, Chari and Kehoe (2003) account for the probability of crises unexplained
by fundamental factors by relying on investorsherd behaviour in an environment with
heterogenous information; in contrast, our results are derived within a rational expectations
framework where all investors share the same information about asset payo¤s. Finally, within
the class of multiple-equilibrium based theories, our framework di¤ers from third generation
models of currency crises (e.g., Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2001 and 2004) by focusing
on the instability of aggregate credit, rather than the volatility of nominal exchange rates;
it also di¤ers from innite-horizon models where self-fullling asset-price movements are the
outcome of steady state indeterminacy, i.e., the multiplicity of converging perfect-foresight
equilibrium paths (as in Challe, 2004, for example).6
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
derives its unique fundamental (i.e., rst-best e¢ cient) equilibrium. Section 3 shows how
the interdependency between endogenous lending and the excessive risk-taking of portfolio
investors may give rise to multiple equilibria associated with di¤erent levels of lending, asset
prices, and output. Section 4 derives the stochastic equilibria of this economy (i.e., equilibria
featuring self-fullling crises), and analyses their welfare properties. Section 5 o¤ers two
extensions to the basic model, while Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Timing and assets
There are three dates, 0, 1 and 2, and two real assets. One asset, safe and in variable supply,
is two-period lived and yields f(x) units of the (all-purpose) good at date t+1 for x  0 units
invested at date t; t = 0; 1. It is assumed that f (:) is a twice continuously di¤erentiable
6Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) o¤er a model of emerging country bubbles where the bursting of
the bubble is associated with a capital ow reversal. In their model, the existence of bubbles is related to
the relative scarcity of available stores of value (as in Tirole (1985)), while our bubbles owe their existence
to agency problems in the nancial sector leading to excessive risk-taking by investors.
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function satisfying f 0 (x) > 0; f 00 (x) < 0; f (0) = 0; f 0 (0) = 1 and f 0 (1) = 0. Moreover,
the following standard assumption is made to limit the curvature of f (:), for all x > 0:
 (x)   xf 00 (x) =f 0 (x) < 1: (1)
The other asset is risky, in xed supply (normalised to 1), and three-period lived it
is available for buying at date 0 and delivers a terminal payo¤ R at date 2, where R is a
random variable at dates 0 and 1 that takes on the value Rh with probability  2 (0; 1] ; and
0 otherwise, at date 2. Although more general distributions for the fundamental uncertainty
a¤ecting the asset payo¤ can be considered, we choose this simple specication in order to
focus on the extrinsic uncertainty generated by the presence of multiple equilibria.
The interpretation of this menu of available assets is that the supply of the risky asset
responds slowly to changes in its demand (think of real estate, for example), while that
of the safe asset adjusts quickly, and we consider the way markets clear in the short run.
The market price of the risky asset at date t, in terms of the good (which is taken as the
numeraire), is denoted Pt; t = 0; 1.
2.2 Agents and market structure
The economy consists of four types of risk-neutral agents in large numbers7. There is a
continuum of three-period lived lenders of mass 1, who enter the market at date 0 and leave
it at date 2. Their intertemporal utility is u (c1; c2) = c1 + c2, where ct; t = 1; 2, is date t
consumption and  > 0 is the discount factor (lenders do not enjoy date 0 consumption).
Lenders receive an endowment e0 > 0 at date 0 and e1 at date 1, regarding which the
following technical assumption is made:
e1 > f
0 1 (1=) + Rh: (2)
As will become clear below, condition (2) is necessary and su¢ cient for all the equilibria
that we analyse in the paper to correspond to interior solutions (i.e., where both c1 and c2
are positive). Given the lendersassumed utility function, the entire endowment e0 is saved
at date 0 (provided that the ex ante return on saving at date 0 is non negative, as will
7The paper focuses on the risk-neutral case, in which all results can be derived analytically. The risk-
averse case is explored numerically as an extension to the baseline model in Section 5.2.
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always be the case), while savings decisions at date 1 depend on the comparison between the
expected return on savings then and the gross rate of time preference, 1=. This possibility
that lenders consume, rather than lend, part of their wealth at date 1 renders aggregate
lending endogenous at that date, and is the novel and crucial feature of our model.
Lenders face overlapping generations of two-period lived investors and entrepreneurs with
positive mass, entering the economy at dates 0 and 1 and maximising end-of-life consumption.
In the remainder of the paper, we shall refer to date t investors (entrepreneurs) as the
investors (entrepreneurs) who enter the economy at date t, t = 0; 1, and leave it at date
t+1. Neither investors nor entrepreneurs receive any endowment. Finally, the stock of risky
assets is initially held by a class of one-period lived initial asset holders, who sell them to
investors at date 0 and then leave the market.
There is market segmentation (i.e., restrictions on agents asset holdings) in the two
following senses. First, only entrepreneurs have access to the production technology f (:).
Since they have no wealth of their own, they borrow funds by issuing XSt corporate bonds
(at the normalised price 1) at date t (= 0; 1). Entrepreneursutility maximisation under
perfect competition then ensures that the gross interest rate on corporate bonds at date
t (= 0; 1), called rt, is equal to the marginal product of capital at the same date, f 0 (XSt).
Second, lenders cannot directly buy risky assets or corporate bonds, and must thus lend
to investors to nance future consumption. This restriction implies that market equilibria
at dates 0 and 1 are intermediated, with lenders rst entrusting investors with their savings,
and investors then lending to entrepreneurs (i.e., buying XSt corporate bonds at price 1) and
investing in risky assets (i.e., buying XRt assets at price Pt)8. We denote Bt, t = 0; 1; the
demand for loans by date t investors (which, in equilibrium, equals lenderssavings at the
same date). Finally, we follow Allen and Gale (2000) in assuming that lenders and investors
are restricted to simple debt contracts, where the contracted rate on these loans, denoted
rlt; t = 0; 1, cannot be conditional on the loan size or, due to asymmetric information,
the investors portfolio. As will be shown below, the use of debt contracts with limited
liability causes lendersand investorsincentives to be misaligned, and is the basic market
imperfection in the model.
8This structure implies that lenders have no choice but to lend to investors to nance future consumption.
Section 5.1 shows that all our results carry over when lenders have access to a storage technology whose
positive gross return competes with risky lending.
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2.3 Fundamental equilibrium
In the intermediated economy described above, investors are granted exclusive access to
the markets for risky assets and corporate bonds. Before analysing the resulting market
outcome in more detail, it is useful to rst derive the equilibrium that would prevail without
these restrictions, i.e., if lenders could directly buy both real assets. The corresponding
fundamentalequilibrium, in which prices and quantities are rst-best e¢ cient, will provide
a natural benchmark against which the intermediated equilibrium can be compared. As is
usual with nite horizon economies, we work out equilibrium prices and quantities backwards,
using date 1 outcomes to solve for date 0 equilibrium conditions.
Subgame equilibrium at date 1. Given their date 1 wealth, denoted W1, lenders maximise
E1u (c1; c2) = c1+E1c2. Since lendersdate 1 savings, B1, equal safe asset investment, XS1,
plus risky asset investment, XR1P1, lendersexpected utility from saving B1 and choosing a
portfolio (XS1; XR1) at date 1 is
W1  B1 + E1
 
rF1 XS1 +RXR1

= W1  B1 + 
 
rF1 B1 +XR1
 
Rh   rF1 P F1

; (3)
where P F1 and r
F
1 denote the date 1 fundamental values of the risky asset and the interest
rate, respectively. Given B1, the price of the asset in the fundamental equilibrium must be:
P F1 = R
h=rF1 : (4)
If the fundamental value of the risky assets were lower than Rh=rF1 ; then the net return
on trading them, Rh   rF1 P F1 ; would be positive for all positive values of XR1 and lenders
would want to buy an innite quantity of risky assets; if it were higher than Rh=rF1 , then
this net return would be negative and the demand for risky assets would be zero. Since the
risky asset is in positive and nite supply, neither P F1 < R
h=rF1 nor P
F
1 > R
h=rF1 can be
equilibrium situations.
Using equation (4) and the fact that in equilibrium XR1 = 1 and thus rF1 = f
0(XS1) =
f 0(B1   P F1 ), market-clearing for corporate bonds implies:
f 0 1(rF1 ) + R
h=rF1 = B1: (5)
Given the properties of f(:), equation (5) denes rF1 uniquely for all positive values of
B1. It can thus be inverted to yield the interest rate function rF1 (B1), where r
F
1 (B1) is
continuous, strictly decreasing, and such that rF1 (0) =1 and rF1 (1) = 0.
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Substituting (4) into (3), we can see that lendersexpected utility isW1 B1+B1rF1 (B1).
Given lendersutility functions and our assumption of a high enough date 1 endowment (see
(2)), lenders increase savings up to the point where the rate of return on savings, rF1 (B1) ; is
equal to the gross rate of time preference, 1= (see gure 1 below). Substituting rF1 = 1=
into equations (4) and (5), we nd that asset prices and aggregate savings in the fundamental
equilibrium are uniquely determined and given by:
P F1 = R
h; (6)
BF1 = f
0 1 (1=) + Rh; (7)
where inequality (2) ensures that BF1 < e1; i.e., that the fundamental equilibrium is interior.
In short, lendersrisk neutrality implies that the fundamental value of the asset, P F1 , is equal
to the discounted expected dividend stream, Rh; while capital investment, XFS1; is at the
point where its rate of return equals lendersrate of time preference, f 0 1 (1=).
Equilibrium at date 0. The fundamental price vector at date 1, (P F1 ; r
F
1 ); can now be used to
derive that at date 0, (P F0 ; r
F
0 ), by simply noting that the equilibrium price of risky assets
at date 1, P F1 ; is also the payo¤ from holding them from date 0 to date 1. Lenderstotal
(deterministic) payo¤at date 1 from choosing a portfolio (XS0; XR0) at date 0 is then rF0 X0S+
P F1 XR0, which they maximise subject to the portfolio choice constraint XS0 + P
F
0 XR0 = e0,
while taking r0 and P0 as given. They thus maximise:
rF0 X0S + P
F
1 XR0 = e0r
F
0 +XR0
 
P F1   rF0 P F0

:
Given e0rF0 , the fundamental value of the risky asset at date 0 cannot be higher (lower)
than P F1 =r
F
0 , since asset demand would then be equal to zero (innity). It must thus be:
P F0 = P
F
1 =r
F
0 = R
h=rF0 : (8)
Using (8), the properties of f(:), and the fact that XR0 = 1 and thus rF0 = f
0(XS0) =
f 0(e0   P F0 ) in equilibrium, rF0 is uniquely determined by the following equation:
f 0 1(rF0 ) + R
h=rF0 = e0: (9)
Equations (8)(9) fully characterise equilibrium prices and quantities at date 0 and com-
plete our derivation of the fundamental equilibrium of this economy. The remainder of the
paper then works out equilibrium prices and quantities for the intermediated case, i.e., where
lenders no longer have direct access to the markets for risky assets and corporate bonds.
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3 Endogenous lending and multiple equilibria
This Section and the following one derive the intermediated equilibrium (equilibria) of the
economy, using a method similar to that used for the fundamental case above. The present
Section solves for the equilibrium at date 1, and shows how the interplay between endogenous
lending and the risk-shifting problem may lead to multiple equilibria. Section 4 then uses
date 1 outcomes to derive the stochastic equilibria of the full model.
3.1 Market clearing at date 1
Contracted loan rate. Date 1 investors borrow B1 ( 0) from lenders, which they use to buy
XS1 corporate bonds at price 1 and XR1 risky assets at price P1 (so that B1 = XS1+XR1P1).
The use of debt contracts with limited liability allows investors to default, and earn 0, when
their total payo¤ at date 2, r1XS1 + RXR1; is less than the amount owed to lenders, rl1B1.
Thus, the terminal consumption of date 1 investors is:
max

r1XS1 +RXR1   rl1B1; 0

= max

XR1 (R  r1P1) +B1
 
r1   rl1

; 0

:
Note from the latter equation that the contracted rate on loans between lenders and
investors, rl1, must be equal to the interest rate on corporate bonds, r1. If r1 > r
l
1, then
investors would want to borrow an unlimited amount of funds from lenders and use them to
buy corporate bonds; they would then reach the nite limit of available funds, and from then
compete for loans until r1 = rl1. If r1 < r
l
1 then investorsloan demand would be nil, implying
that the return on corporate bonds would be r1 = f 0 (0) = 1; a contradiction. Thus, any
equilibrium in the markets for loans and corporate bonds must satisfy rl1 = r1 = f
0 (XS1). At
this loan rate, perfect competition amongst investors drives down the net return on trading
corporate bonds to zero.
Asset prices and interest rate. Since B1
 
r1   rl1

= 0; investorsterminal consumption is
simply max [XR1 (R  r1P1) ; 0] : Because XR1 (0  r1P1) < 0 for all P1 > 0; investors default
on loans when the asset payo¤is 0, and this occurs with probability 1 . Their expected date
2 consumption is thus XR1
 
Rh   r1P1

, provided they do not default when the asset payo¤
is Rh (i.e., provided XR1
 
Rh   r1P1

is non-negative, as is always the case in equilibrium).
Given their objective of maximising expected terminal consumption, market clearing for the
11
risky asset implies that its equilibrium price must be:
P1 = R
h=r1: (10)
If the price of the asset were lower (higher) than Rh=r1; then Rh   r1P1 would be pos-
itive (negative) for all positive values of XR1 and date 1 investors would want to buy in-
nitely many (zero) risky assets. Given (10), investors consumption when R = Rh is
XR1
 
Rh   r1P1

= 0. The reason for this is intuitive: because markets are competitive,
investors must make zero expected prots on trading risky assets. Since they earn zero when
R = 0 and they default, they must also earn zero when R = Rh, which is ensured by the
equilibrium price (10). Thus, in equilibrium the terminal consumption of date 1 investors is
zero under both possible values of R at date 2.
Using equation (10) and the fact that in equilibrium XR1 = 1 and r1 = f 0 (XS1) ; we have
r1 = f
0 (B1   P1). Market clearing for corporate bonds at date 1 then implies:
f 0 1 (r1) +Rh=r1 = B1: (11)
From the hypothesised properties of f (:) ; equation (11) uniquely denes the equilibrium
interest rate for all positive values of B1: The implied interest rate function, r1 (B1) ; is
continuous and such that r01 (B1) < 0, r1 (0) =1 and r1 (1) = 0. Equations (10)(11) then
fully characterise the intermediated equilibrium price vector at date 1, (P1; r1); conditional
on the amount of aggregate lending, B1.
Note from (5) and (11) that, for a given quantity of savings B1, the intermediated interest
rate, r1, is higher than its fundamental analogue, rF1 . This can be explained as follows. For
a given value of B1; the expected asset payo¤ that accrues to investors in the intermediated
equilibrium, Rh, is higher than the expected payo¤to lenders in the fundamental equilibrium,
Rh. In consequence, risky assets are bid up in the intermediated equilibrium and safe
asset investment, XS1; is crowded out, which in turn raises the equilibrium interest rate, r1
(relative to the fundamental rate, rF1 ). The intermediated equilibrium is thus characterised
by risk shifting, in the sense that portfolio delegation to debt-nanced investors leads to an
excessive share of risky asset investment, and too little safe asset investment, relative to the
e¢ cient portfolio (i.e., the fundamental equilibrium). The implications of this distortion for
equilibrium asset prices and savings are analysed further in Section 3.4.
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3.2 Expected return on loans
Given lendersutility functions, individual lending decisions at date 1 depend on the expected
return on the loans they make to investors, denoted 1; as compared to the gross rate of time
preference, 1=. Note that 1 in general di¤ers from the contracted loan rate, r1, because of
the possibility that date 1 investors default on loans at date 2.
When date 1 investors do not default on loans (i.e., when R = Rh), the contracted
loan rate applies and they repay lenders r1B1. When they do default, lenders gather the
residual value of investorsportfolio, i.e., the capitalised value of corporate bonds, r1XS1 =
r1 (B1   P1) : The ex ante unit loan return is thus r1+(1  ) r1 (1  P1=B1) or, using (10)
and the interest rate function r1 = r1 (B1),
1 (B1) = r1 (B1) 
(1  )Rh
B1
(> 0) : (12)
Note from equations (5), (11) and (12) that the probability that investors go bust at
date 2, 1   , indexes the distance between the contracted and actual ex ante returns on
savings, r1 and 1. When  = 1 the risk-shifting problem disappears since portfolio investors
never default; the intermediated loan return, 1 (B1) ; is then identical to the contracted
loan rate, r1 (B1) ; which in turn equals the fundamental return, rF1 (B1); in this case, the
date 1 intermediated equilibrium is uniquely determined by equations (6)(7). When  < 1;
investorsand lendersincentives become misaligned, and a gap (1  )Rh=B1 > 0 appears
between r1 and 1. Thus, 1    measures both the severity of the risk-shifting problem in
the economy (i.e., the extent to which investors take more risk than if they were playing
with their own funds) and the implied distortion in the intermediated return on loans (i.e.,
r1   1).
To analyse the existence and properties of the intermediated equilibrium when  < 1,
we have to characterise the behaviour of 1 (B1) as total loans, B1; vary over (0;1). First,
note that 1 (B1) is continuous and such that 1 (1) = 0 and 1 (0) = 1:9 Although this
implies that @1 (B1) =@B1 must be negative somewhere, the two terms on the right-hand
side of (12) indicate that, over a given interval [Ba; Bb]  (0;1), the change in 1 (B1) as a
function of B1 is of ambiguous sign.
The rst term of the right-hand side of (12), r1 (B1), is the (decreasing) interest rate
9That 1 (0) =1 can be seen from the facts that r1 (0) =1 (see (11)) and XS1=B1  0 in (14).
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function dened by equation (11): an increase in B1 raises the amount invested in the
safe asset, XS1, which reduces the equilibrium interest rate, r1 = f 0 (XS1) ; and thus the
average return on loans; this is the usual marginal productivity e¤ectof aggregate savings
on the loan return. In contrast, the second term,   (1  )Rh=B1; increases with B1; this
latter e¤ect reects the impact of the total loan amount on the average riskiness of loans
as the composition of the optimal portfolio varies with B1. To analyse this second e¤ect in
more detail, rst use (11) to write the relationship between safe asset investment, XS1; and
aggregate lending, B1, as follows:
B1 = XS1 +R
h=f 0 (XS1) : (13)
From (13) and assumption (1) regarding the concavity of f (:), it is easy to check that
an increase in B1 raises both the quantity of safe assets, XS1, and the share of safe asset
investment in investorsportfolio, XS1=B1 (i.e., it lowers B1=XS1 = 1 + Rh=XS1f 0 (XS1)).
In other words, even though an increase in B1 lowers r1 and thus raises asset prices, Rh=r1,
the relative size of risky asset investment, P1=B1 = 1   XS1=B1; tends to decrease as B1
increases. This portfolio composition e¤ect in turn limits the loss to lenders in case of
investorsdefault and tends to raise the ex ante return on loans.
Given these two e¤ects, the crucial question is: Are there intervals of B1 over which
1 (B1)may be increasing, i.e., where the portfolio composition e¤ect dominates the marginal
productivity e¤ect? To get an insight into the conditions under which this is the case, solve
(11) for Rh and substitute the resulting expression into (12) to obtain:
1 (B1) = r1 (B1) ( + (1  ) (XS1=B1)) : (14)
Both e¤ects are made explicit in (14). Intuitively, for the increase in XS1=B1 to dominate
the decrease in r1 (B1) induced by a marginal increase in B1, 1  must be su¢ ciently large
(i.e., the risk-shifting problem must be large enough), and  r01 (B1) (> 0) must be not too
large (i.e., the marginal productivity e¤ect must be weak enough). When this is the case,
strategic complementarities(in the sense of Cooper and John, 1988) in lending decisions
appear, as a symmetric decision by other lenders to increase their loans may then lead
any individual lender to do the same. Proposition 1 formally establishes the conditions for
such complementarities to occur in the general case, as well as for a more specic class of
production functions.
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Proposition 1 (Strategic complementarities). The loan return curve, 1 (B1), is in-
creasing in total loans, B1, provided  and  f 00 (x) are not too large. In the isoelastic case
where f (x) = x1 = (1  ),  2 (0; 1), 1 (B1) has exactly one (zero) increasing interval if
2 +
p
 < () 1:
The proof is in the Appendix. For a general function f(:), there may be several intervals of
B1 over which 1 (B1) is increasing, i.e., over which the implied f 00 (XS1) is su¢ ciently small
(provided  is not too large). In the isoelastic case, a high value of  increases the curvature
of f (:) and strengthens the marginal productivity e¤ect; thus, neither  nor  must be too
large for the portfolio composition e¤ect to dominate the marginal productivity e¤ect. In
the remainder of the paper, we shall focus on a particularly simple case of non-monotonicity
by assuming that 1 (B1) has one single increasing interval, as depicted in Figure 1, and as
implied by the isoelastic case when 2+
p
 < 1 (all of our results generalise straightforwardly
to the case of multiple increasing intervals).
Figure 1: Loan market equilibrium at date 1
ρ1(B1)
1/β
e1B1l B1h B1F
Expected
loan return
Total loans
r1F(B1)
3.3 Loan market equilibrium
Having characterised the ex ante loan return, 1, as a function of aggregate loans, B1, we may
now analyse the way the latter is determined in equilibrium. At date 1, lenders choose the
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individual level of loans, B^1, that maximises expected utility, c1+E1c2; taking 1 = 1 (B1)
as given. Given the lendersutility function, they nd it worthwhile to increase (decrease)
savings whenever 1 > (<) 1=. Any interior equilibrium must thus satisfy 1 = 1=. We
focus on symmetric Nash equilibria, where consumption/savings plans are identical across
lenders (i.e., B^1 = B1) and no lender nds it worthwhile to individually alter his own plan.
Figure 1 shows how multiple intersections between the 1 (B)-curve and the 1=-line,
when they occur, give rise to multiple equilibria.10 Bl1 and B
h
1 represent two stable levels
of aggregate lending, i.e., where a symmetric marginal move away from equilibrium by all
lenders alters the loan return in such a way as to move the economy back to equilibrium. The
value of B1 where the 1 (B1)-curve crosses the 1=-line from below is not stable and will not
be discussed any further (starting from this point, an arbitrarily small increase (decrease) in
B1 tends to increase (decrease) 1 (B1), triggering a further move away from equilibrium).
In both stable equilibria the ex ante return on loans is 1=, and lenders (expected) date 2
consumption, conditional on the selection of equilibrium j, j = l; h, is 1(B1)B
j
1 = B
j
1=.
Recall from equation (13) that an increase in B1 lowers marginal productivity but also
reduces the share of risky assets in investors portfolios. The low-lending equilibrium is
thus characterised by a high safe return but a high share of risky assets in the portfolio,
while the high-lending equilibrium exhibits a low safe return but a safer average portfolio.
Finally, notice that even though both equilibria yield the same ex ante return on loans, 1=,
they are always associated with di¤erent levels of interest rates, asset prices, productive
investment, and (expected) date 2 output: equation (11) and the fact that Bh1 > B
l
1 implies
that r1(Bh) < r1(Bl): Then, denoting P
j
1 the assets price, X
j
S1 productive investment, and
E1 (Y j j) expected date 2 output (in the sense of the total quantity of goods available for
agentsconsumption) when total lending is Bj1, we have:
P h1 = R
h=r1(B
h) > P l1 = R
h=r1(B
l);
XhS1 = f
0 1  r1(Bh) > X lS1 = f 0 1  r1(Bl) ;
E1 (Y jh) = f(XhS1) + Rh > E1 (Y j l) = f(X lS1) + Rh:
10Assumption (2), together with the fact (as proved and analysed further in Section 3.4) that Bh1 < B
f
1 ,
ensures that both Bl1 and B
h
1 are interior solutions which are independent of the amount of goods that
lenders receive from the loans they made at date 0. Any income from these loans is thus consumed at date
1 (the e¤ects of date 0 loans on lendersdate 1 wealth and consumption are analysed in Section 4 2).
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In short, the selection of the low-lending equilibrium raises the interest rate and depresses
asset prices, productive investment, and future output, relative to the equilibrium with high
lending. (More generally, there may be more than two stable equilibria if 1 (B1) has more
than one increasing interval, but their properties are similar to the 2-equilibrium case, i.e.,
the higher is B1, the lower is r1(B1), and the higher are P1, XS1 and E1 (Y )).
3.4 Comparison with the fundamental equilibrium
We emphasised above that the risk-shifting problem arising under market segmentation leads
investors to overinvest in risky assets, relative to the fundamental equilibrium. Proposition 2
summarises the implications of this distortion for the price of the risky asset and the amount
of aggregate saving in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Asset bubbles and crowding out). In both intermediated equilibria,
asset prices are higher than in the fundamental equilibrium (i.e., P j1 > P
F
1 ; j = l; h), while
aggregate savings are lower than in the fundamental equilibrium (i.e., Bj1 < B
F
1 ; j = l; h).
The proof is in the Appendix. That P j1 > P
F
1 ; j = l; h; indicates that assets are
overpriced at date 1 in both intermediated equilibria, i.e., both equilibria are associated
with a positive bubble in asset prices (the bubble being larger, the larger is aggregate credit).
Because investors are protected against a bad value of the asset payo¤ by the use of simple
debt contracts, they bid up the asset, with the consequence of raising its price and its share
in equilibrium portfolios (relative to the fundamental equilibrium).
The reason why savings are lower in both intermediated equilibria than in the fundamen-
tal equilibrium (i.e., Bl1 < B
h
1 < B
F
1 ) follows naturally: excessive risky asset investment by
portfolio investors implies that, for any given level of savings B1, the intermediated ex ante
loan return, 1 (B1), is lower than the fundamental return, r
F
1 (B1) = 1= (see our analysis
in Section 3.1). Lenders thus optimally reduce lending in the intermediated equilibrium (rel-
ative to the fundamental one) up to the point where this intermediated return equals the
fundamental return, i.e., the gross rate of time preference 1=. Note, as a consequence, that
a double crowding out e¤ect is in fact at work onXS1 in the intermediated equilibrium. First,
for a given level of aggregate savings B1, bubbly asset prices crowd out safe asset investment,
XS1, which raises the equilibrium interest rate, r1 = f 0 (XS1). Second, lendersoptimal re-
17
action to the resulting price distortion is to reduce savings, B1, which lowers XS1 (and raises
r1) even further. The crowding out of productive investment by the asset bubble is the basic
source of output loss in the intermediated economy, relative to the fundamental equilibrium.
The implications of this loss as to the welfare ranking of the (many) intermediated equilibria
are analysed in the context of the full stochastic model below.
4 Self-fullling nancial crises
The previous Section showed that the excessive risk taking of portfolio investors may lead,
under endogenous credit, to the existence of multiple equilibria at date 1 associated with
di¤erent levels of aggregate lending, interest rates, and asset prices. We now analyse the
full time span of the model to demonstrate the possibility of a self-fullling nancial crisis
associated with the risk that the low-lending equilibrium is selected.
4.1 Market clearing at date 0
Crisis equilibria are constructed by randomising over the two possible lending equilibria
that may prevail at date 1. More specically, assume that, from the point of view of date
0, high lending is selected with probability p 2 (0; 1) at date 1, so that the sunspoton
which agents coordinate their expectations causes lending and asset prices to drop down to
low levels with probability 1   p. With this specication for extraneous uncertainty at the
intermediate date, the model potentially has a continuum of stochastic equilibria indexed
by the ex ante probability of a market crash, 1   p. Since the assets price at date 1 is
the asset payo¤ accruing to date 0 investors, this uncertainty about asset prices creates a
risk-shifting problem at date 0 similar to that created at date 1 by intrinsic uncertainty
about the terminal payo¤ of the asset. This causes the asset to be bid up at date 0, with
the possibility that a self-fullling crisis (i.e., a drop in asset prices forcing date 0 investors
into bankruptcy) occurs at date 1 if the low lending/low asset prices equilibrium is selected
at that date.11
11For the sake of conciseness, we focus on equilibria where nancial crises may actually occur at date 1
(i.e., where date 0 investors may go bankrupt), and thus leave out of the analysis equilibria with deterministic
date 1 outcomes, i.e., p = 1 (high lending is selected for sure) and p = 0 (low lending for sure).
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Contracted loan rate. Denote (P0, r0) the equilibrium price vector, rl0 the contracted loan
rate, and (XS0; XR0) the portfolio of date 0 investors, all at date 0: Limited liability and the
portfolio constraint B0 = XS0+ P0XS0 imply that investorsterminal consumption is:
max

r0XS0 + P1XR0   rl0B0; 0

= max

XR0 (P1   r0P0) +B0
 
r0   rl0

; 0

;
where, given our specication for extraneous uncertainty about aggregate lending and asset
prices, P1 is a random variable at date 0, taking on the value P h1 with probability p (i.e., B
h
1
is selected), and P l1 otherwise (B
l
1 is selected), at date 1. The contracted rate on loans at
date 0, rl0, must necessarily be equal to the rate on corporate bonds at the same date, r0. If
the former were lower (higher) than r0, then date 0 investors would want to borrow innitely
many (zero) units of goods and use them to buy corporate bonds, while the loan supply at
date 0 is exactly e0 (the gross expected return on loans at date 0 is always non-negative,
because the liquidation value of date-0 portfolios cannot be negative). Thus, any equilibrium
must satisfy r0 = rl0 and B0 = e0.
Asset prices and interest rate. In the equilibria that we are considering, date 0 investors
default on loans when the asset price at date 1 is P l1, but not when it is P
h
1 . Since
B0
 
r0   rl0

= 0; their terminal consumption is XR0
 
P h1   r0P0
  0 with probability p,
and 0 otherwise. Date 0 investors choose the level of XR0 that maximises expected con-
sumption, pXR0
 
P h1   r0P0

, while any potential solution to their decision problem must be
such that they do not default on loans if the asset price at date 1 is P h1 , but do default if it
is P l1, i.e.,
P h1   r0P0  0; P l1   r0P0 < 0: (15)
The demand for risky assets by date 0 investors, XR0; is innite (zero) if P h1   r0P0 >
0 (< 0) : Market clearing thus requires that the equilibrium price of the risky asset be:
P0 = P
h
1 =r0; (16)
which satises both inequalities in (15). Again, the interpretation of this equilibrium price
is straightforward. Perfect competition for the risky asset by investors implies an asset price
such that they make zero expected prot. Because they make zero prot from holding risky
assets when the asset payo¤ is P l1 (i.e., when they default), they must also earn zero when
it is P h1 ; this is exactly what the equilibrium price P
h
1 =r0 ensures.
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Aggregate lending from date 0 to date 1 is e0. In equilibrium we have XR0 = 1 and
r0 = f
0 (XS0) = f 0 (e0   P0). Thus, r0 is uniquely determined by the following equation:
f 0 1 (r0) + P h1 =r0 = e0; (17)
where P h1 = R
h=r1(B
h
1 ) is independent of e0, due to the interiority of B
h
1 allowed by assump-
tion (2). Note from (16)-(17) that the equilibrium price vector at date 0, (P0; r0), is uniquely
determined and does not depend on the probability of a crisis, 1   p: as date 0 investors
are protected against a bad shock to the value of their portfolio by the use of simple debt
contracts, they simply disregard the lower end of the payo¤ distribution (i.e., the payo¤ P l1
with probability 1  p) when selecting their optimal portfolio.
Asset bubbles and crowding out. We complete this Section by showing that the risk-shifting
problem due to date 1 extraneous uncertainty and the limited liability of date 0 investors
causes asset prices to be overvalued at date 0, and to crowd out real investment at that date,
XS0. From (8)(9) and (16)(17), the mispricing of risky assets at date 0 is given by:
P0   P F0 = f 0 1(rF0 )  f 0 1 (r0) :
Using (9) and (17), together with the fact that P h1 > P
F
1 (which was established in
Proposition 2), it is easily seen that r0 > rF0 . Since f
0 1 (:) is decreasing, P0   P F0 > 0 and
there is a positive asset price bubble at date 0. Note that e0 being exogenously given, the
amount of crowding out caused by this bubble is simply XFS0 XS0 = P0 P F0 : The implied
lower level of capital investment at date 0 in turn lowers date 1 output, f (XS0), in the same
way as date 2 (expected) output, f (XS1) + Rh; was lowered by the asset bubble at date 1.
4.2 The wealth e¤ect of crises
Having shown the existence of a continuum of stochastic equilibria indexed by the proba-
bility of a self-fullling crisis, we are now in a position to study the welfare properties of
these equilibria in more details. We rst analyse the way crises a¤ect lenderswealth and
intertemporal consumption plans, and then turn to the e¤ect of crises on other agentsutility.
To see why lenderswealth at date 1 is contingent on whether a crisis occurs at date 1 or
not, we calculate how it is a¤ected by the possible default of date-0 investors. When these
investors do not default, they owe lenders the capitalised value of outstanding debt at date
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1, r0e0. As lenders receive an endowment e1 at date 1, their date 1 wealth if no crisis occurs
is simply W h1 = e1 + r0e0. When investors do default, on the contrary, lenderswealth at
date 1 is their date 1 endowment, e1, plus the residual value of the date 0 investorsportfolio,
r0X0S + P
l
1. Using (17), lendersdate 1 wealth, W
j
1 , conditional on whether a crisis occurs
(j = l) or not (j = h), is thus given by:
W j1 = e1 + r0XS0 + P
j
1 ; j = l; h: (18)
Obviously, the total quantity of goods available at date 1 is the same across equilibria,
because initial capital investment, XS0, is uniquely determined (i.e., it does not depend on
p). This quantity amounts to lendersdate 1 endowment, e1, plus entrepreneursproduc-
tion, f (XS0) ; the latter being shared between date 0 entrepreneurs, who gather the surplus
f (XS0)  r0XS0 in competitive equilibrium, and lenders, who receive r0XS0 (recall that P0
is such that date 0 investors consume zero whether P1 = P l1 or P
h
1 ).
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From condition (2) and the second inequality stated in Proposition 2, we have Bj1 <
BF1 < W
j
1 , j = l; h, implying that both possible levels of wealth give rise to interior solutions
for consumption-savings plans at date 1 where 1(B
j
1) = 1=. If a crisis occurs at date 1,
then lenderswealth and savings at that date are W l1 and B
l
1; respectively, while their date
1 and (expected) date 2 consumption levels are W l1   Bl1 and Bl1=, respectively; it follows
that their discounted utility ow from date 1 on is simply W l1   Bl1 +   Bl1= = W l1.
Similarly, if a crisis does not occur at date 1, then lendersdate 1 and date 2 consumption
levels are W h1   Bh1 and Bh1=, respectively, yielding a discounted utility from date 1 on of
W h1 . Weighing these possible outcomes with the probabilities that they actually occur, and
then using (18), we nd that lendersex ante utility (i.e., from the point of view of date 0)
depends on the crisis probability, 1  p, as follows:
E0W1 = pW
h
1 + (1  p)W l1
= e1 + r0XS0 + pP
h
1 + (1  p)P l1:
12There are two equivalent ways of characterising lendersbudget sets at date 1: looking at their wealth,
W j1 is assigned to date 1 consumption and date 1 lending, so that, using (18), W
j
1 = e1 + r0X0S + P
j
1 =
cj1 + B
j
1; j = l; h; the total quantity of goods accruing to lenders at date 1 is ultimately shared between
date 1 consumption, cj1; and date 1 capital investment, X
j
S1, so that e1 + r0X0S = c
j
1 +X
j
S1; j = l; h: Since
Bj1 = X
j
S1 + P
j
1 , these two formulations are, obviously, mutually consistent.
21
E0W1 is decreasing in 1 p, since P h1 > P l1 and e1+r0XS0; P l1 and P h1 do not depend on p.
Note that it is the selection of the low-lending equilibrium itself that triggers the crisis which
lowers lenderswealth and discounted consumption ow. Thus, the utility loss incurred by
lenders when a crisis occurs is akin to a pure coordination failure in consumption/savings
decisions rather than an exogenously assumed destruction of value associated with the early
liquidation of the long asset, as is often assumed in liquidity-based theories of nancial crises
(e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, Allen and Gale, 2000, and Chang and Velasco, 2002).
4.3 Aggregate welfare
We can now complete the welfare analysis of the model by studying the e¤ect of the ex
ante crisis probability on other agentsconsumption. With respect to investors, Sections 3.1
and 4.1 have established that both date 0 and date 1 investors consume zero in equilibrium,
whatever the realisation of extrinsic (date 1) and fundamental (date 2) uncertainty. Investors
ex ante welfare is thus zero in all equilibria. With respect to entrepreneurs, the terminal
consumption of date-1 entrepreneurs is f (XS1)   XS1f 0 (XS1), which is increasing in XS1.
Since XhS1 > X
l
S1 (see Section 3.3), their ex ante welfare, from the point of view of date 0, is
p
 
f
 
XhS1
 XhS1f 0  XhS1 + (1  p)  f  X lS1 X lS1f 0  X lS1, which decreases with 1   p.
Date 0 entrepreneurs consume f (XS0) f 0 (XS0)XS0, whereXS0 = f 0 1(r0) does not depend
on p. Finally, initial asset holdersconsumption is just the selling price of the asset at date
0, P0, which is independent of p. In short, neither investors nor initial asset holders or date
0 entrepreneurs are a¤ected by the crisis probability. Lenders are, because the crisis reduces
their asset wealth and discounted consumption ow. Date 1 entrepreneurs are, because low
lending reduces their surplus and terminal consumption. We summarise the main results
derived from Section 4 in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Crises and welfare). When multiple levels of lending may prevail at
date 1, the model has a continuum of stochastic equilibria indexed by the probability of a
self-fullling crisis, 1  p 2 (0; 1). The higher this probability, the lower is ex ante welfare.
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5 Extensions
Propositions 1-3 were derived under stark simplifying assumptions about agentspreferences
and the technologies that are available to them. We now test the robustness of our results
by relaxing two signicant hypotheses, namely, i) the absence of investment opportunities
other than risky lending available to lenders, and ii) the risk-neutrality of all agents.
5.1 Storage and ight to quality
Our baseline model specication implied that lenders choices at date 1 were limited to
either consumption or risky lending to investors. Assume instead that lenders may protect
themselves from excessive risk-taking by investors by investing part of their wealth at the
safe return  > 0. The latter may reect the possibility for lenders to store wealth in the
form of cash balances or government bonds in a closed economy; alternatively, it may be
interpreted as the world interest rate faced by agents in a small, open economy. We show that
the model with storage generates self-fullling crisis equilibria similar to those analysed in
Sections 3-4, where all lenders symmetrically turn away from risky lending at date 1 to seek
safer investment opportunities. In other words, a ight to quality (rather than a contraction
in aggregate savings) triggers the market crash and nancial crisis.
To keep this alternative formulation of the model concise, assume that the storage tech-
nology is available between dates 1 and 2 only.13 At date 0, lenders lend their entire date 0
wealth, e0, to investors as before. At date 1, they may now spread their current wealth, W1,
between loans to investors, B^1, storage, S^1, and current consumption, c1 = W1   B^1   S^1.
Subgame equilibrium at date 1. The problems faced by entrepreneurs and investors at date
1 are exactly the same as those in the baseline model. Consequently, they yield the same
equilibrium pricing equations (10)(11) and implied ex ante loan return function (12). Given
their current wealth level W1; lenders now choose the quantities (B^1, S^1) that maximise:
E1 (c1 + c2) =W1  B1   S^1 + 

1B^1 +  S^1

;
subject to B^1 + S^1  W1; and taking  and 1 as given. If  < 1=, then lenders will never
nd it worthwhile to store and thus choose S^1 = 0; in which case all potential equilibria are
13Our results can be generalised to the situation where it is also available from date 0 to date 1, but the
full analysis of this case requires substantial algebra without yielding any extra insights.
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identical those analysed in Sections 2-4. We focus on the only robust interesting case by
assuming:14
 > 1=: (19)
When (19) holds, lenders will never nd it worthwhile to consume at date 1 and choose
c1 = 0. They thus maximise E1 (c2) = 1B^1+  S^1; subject to W1 = B^1+ S^1. All symmetric,
interior solutions to this problem are such that B^1 = B1 > 0; S^1 = S1 > 0, and
1 (B1) = r1 (B1)  (1  )Rh=B1 =  ;
where r1 (B1) is dened by equation (11). It is easy to check that assumptions (2) and (19)
imply that e1 > f 0 1 () + Rh= , which in turn ensures that every potential equilibrium
is interior. Figure 2 shows how multiple intersections between the 1-curve and the  -line,
when they occur, give rise to multiple, symmetric Nash equilibria at date 1, associated with
di¤erent levels of lending and storage. The only di¤erence with the baseline model here is
that the appropriate required rate of return, against which 1 is compared by lenders, is now
 rather than 1=.
Figure 2: Loan market equilibrium with storage
Expected
loan return ρ1(B1)
1/β
B1l B1h Total loans
τ
B1F
Equilibrium at date 0. Just as in the baseline model, assume that the model has two stable
subgame equilibria at date 1, Bl1 and B
h
1 , and that, from the point of view of date 0, B
h
1 is
14In the knife-edge situation where  = 1=, B1 and S1+C1 depend on which equilibrium is selected, but
neither S1 nor C1 are determined (i.e., lenders are indi¤erent between storing and consuming at date 1).
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selected with probability p 2 (0; 1). It is easy to check that investors, entrepreneursand
lendersproblems are exactly the same as those described in Section 4.1. Consequently, they
yield the same price vector (P0; r0) as that implied by (16)-(17). Then, it is straightforward
to show the the two statements contained in proposition 3 apply: the model with storage gen-
erates a continuum of stochastic of crisis equilibria, while aggregate welfare unambiguously
decreases with the probability of crisis 1  p.
5.2 Risk-averse agents
The assumption of limited investors liability, coupled with the hypothesis of all agentsrisk
neutrality, introduces a great deal of risk-lovingbehaviour in the economy. This naturally
raises the question whether our results are still valid when agents, especially lenders, are risk-
averse. To investigate this case, assume that investors and entrepreneurs maximise a utility
function v (:) of terminal consumption, dened over (0;1) and such that v0 (:) > 0, v00 (:)  0,
while lendersintertemporal utility is now u (c1; c2) = c1 + v (c2). Entrepreneurschoices
at dates 0 and 1 are not altered by this generalisation, since their terminal consumption
is positive and deterministic. It is easy to check that investorsdecisions are not modied
either, relative to the risk-neutral case, provided they receive an (arbitrarily small) extra
terminal endowment ~e > 0.15 At date 1, lenders now choose individual lending, B^1; which
maximises c1+E1v (c2) ; taking aggregate lending, B1, asset prices, P1, and the interest rate,
r1, as given. If date 1 investors do not default, any individual lender having lent B^1 receives
the contractual repayment r1B^1 at date 2. If investors do default, this lender is entitled to a
share of the residual portfolio, r1 (B1   P1) ; proportional to his share in investorsliabilities,
B^1=B1. Lenders thus solve:
max
B^1
W1   B^1 + 

v(r1B^1) + (1  ) v

B^1  r1 (B1   P1)
B1

: (20)
Recall that lendersdate 1 wealth,W1; is state contingent, as it depends on the capitalised
value of lendersdate 0 loans (see Section 4.3). However any possible equilibrium value of
15The expected utility of date 1 investors is then (1  ) v (~e) + v  XR1  Rh   r1P1+ ~e, yield-
ing the asset demand
 
Rh   r1P1

v0
 
XR1
 
Rh   r1P1

+ ~e

= 0; in equilibrium XR1 = 1 and Rh  
r1P1 = 0 since v0 (~e) is positive and nite. Similarly, the date 0 investors asset demand is such that 
Ph1   r0P0

v0
 
XR0
 
Ph1   r0P0

+ ~e

= 0, yielding (16) in equilibrium. An alternative assumption is that
~e = 0 but limx!0 xv0 (x) = 0.
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W1 can be made large enough, by increasing e1 su¢ ciently, for all corresponding values of
B1 to be interior. Assuming interiority, solving (20) for B^1, and then using P1 = Rh=r1 and
imposing symmetry across lenders (B^1 = B1), we nd that any equilibrium lending level of
the intermediated economy must satisfy:
 (B1)  r1v0 (r1B1) + (1  )

r1   R
h
B1

v0
 
r1B1  Rh

=
1

; (21)
where, from investorsoptimal portfolio choice, r1 = r1 (B1) is dened by equation (11) above.
Note that when v (x) = x then  (B1) = 1 (B1) and (21) is reduced to 1 (B1) = 1=, our
equilibrium condition under risk neutrality. Thus,  (:) generalises the 1 (:) function for the
risk-averse case, and can consequently be interpreted as the risk-correctedex ante return
that lenders expect from their loans to investors (which is 1= in equilibrium).
Figure 3: The risk-corrected expected loan return
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The existence of multiple equilibria requires that  (:) be increasing over at least one
interval of B1. Since we could derive no simple analytical condition ensuring that this
is the case, we computed the  (B1) function numerically for the isoelastic case, where
f (x) = x1 = (1  ) ;  2 (0; 1) ; and v (x) = x1 = (1  ) ;   0; for a variety of parameter
values. We found that  (B1) may have an increasing interval if the risk-shifting problem is
large enough (i.e., 1   is not too small), and if neither f (:) nor u (:) are too concave (i.e.,
neither  nor  are too large). We know from proposition 2 and the discussion in Section
3.2 that high values of  or  are detrimental to multiple equilibria because they make it
less likely that the portfolio composition e¤ect dominate the marginal productivity e¤ect; a
positive value of  strengthens the marginal productivity e¤ect further by making lenders
less willing to substitute current consumption, c1, for future risky consumption, c2.
26
For sake of illustration, Figure 3 represents the risk-corrected loan return curve when  =
Rh = 0:1 and  = 0:5; for di¤erent values of ; As  gradually increases, the increasingness
of  (:) becomes less and less pronounced over the relevant range of B1, until  (:) decreases
over the entire (0;1) interval. Since date 0 equilibrium values are not a¤ected by this
generalisation, we conclude that multiple equilibria and self-fullling crises may still exist in
the risk-averse economy, provided that lenders are not toorisk averse.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper o¤ers a simple theory of self-fullling nancial crises based on the excessive risk
taking of debt-nanced portfolio investors. In our model, the interplay between the amount
of funds available to investors, the composition of their portfolio, and the return that they
are able to o¤er in competitive equilibrium, creates a strategic complementarity between
lenders savings decisions, which naturally give rise to multiple equilibria associated with
di¤erent levels of lending, interest rates, asset prices and future output. Expectations-driven
nancial crises may then occur with positive probability as soon as the economy exhibits
(at least) two possible equilibrium levels of lending, and the coordination of lenders on a
particular equilibrium is determined by an extraneous sunspot. We showed that such crises
are characterised by a self-fullling credit contraction, followed by a market crash, widespread
failures of investors, and a fall in productive investment.
Apart from demonstrating that credit intermediation based on debt contracts is a poten-
tial source of endogenous nancial instability, the model also provides new insights into the
potential welfare costs of nancial crises. In our model, the dramatic reduction in lending
and asset prices associated with the crisis equilibrium has two implications. First, it brings
about a reduction in lenderswealth due to a fall in the total value of their capitalised invest-
ment, which reduces their discounted consumption ow from the time of the crisis onwards.
Second, the credit contraction associated with the crisis causes a fall in productive invest-
ment and output, and consequently reduces entrepreneursprots and consumption. Thus,
both savers and nal producers are hurt by the nancial crisis, while intermediate investors,
whose risk is hedged by the use of debt contracts, are ultimately left unharmed.
27
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
From equation (12), we have that @ (B1) =@B1 > 0 if and only if
 r01 (B1)B21 < (1  )Rh: (A1)
Given  and Rh; (A1) may hold if  r01 (B1) is small enough over some interval of B1,
that is if the interest rate, r1, is not very responsive to changes in the implied level of safe
asset investment, XS1. This in turn holds if f (XS1) is at enoughover the relevant range
of XS1, so that r1 = f 0 (XS1) responds only little to changes in XS1. Using (11), together
with the fact that @f 0 1 (r1) =@r1 = 1=f 00 (XS1), the left-hand side of (A1) yields:
 r01 (B1)B21 =
 
Rh +XS1f
0 (XS1)
2
Rh + f 0 (XS1)
2 = ( f 00 (XS1))
(> 0):
For XS1 2

X;X

, i.e. when B1 2

X +Rh=f 0 (X) ; X +Rh=f 0
 
X

,  r01 (B1)B21 can
be made gradually smaller by decreasing the curvature of f(:) over

X;X

; in this case
f 0 (XS1) is bounded both above and below, and  f 00 (XS1) can be made arbitrarily small,
producing a value of  r01 (B1)B21 small enough for (A1) to hold (provided  6= 1). The larger
is 1  , the more likely it is that inequality (A1) is satised, for a given r1 (B1) function.
Consider now the isoelastic case. When f (XS1) = X
1 
S1 = (1  ) ; equation (11) becomes
B1 (r1) = r
 1=
1 +R
hr 11 , which in turn implies:
r01 (B1) =
1
B01 (r1)
=
1
( 1=) r 1 1=1  Rhr 21
;
where r1 = r1 (B1). From equation (12), @1 (B1) =@B1 > 0 (< 0) when r
0
1 (B1)+(1  )Rh=B21 >
0 (< 0), that is, when
1
( 1=) r 1 1=1  Rhr 21
+
(1  ) =Rh
(r
 1=
1 +R
hr 11 )2
> 0 (< 0) :
Dening Y  r1 1=1 and rearranging, we nd that 1 (B1) increases (decreases) when
	(Y ) = Y 2 +Rh

2  1  


Y + 
 
Rh
2
< 0 (> 0) :
The expression 	(Y ) changes sign over (0;1) if 	(Y ) = 0 has two real roots, including
at least one positive root. A necessary condition for this to hold is that the discriminant of
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	(Y ) = 0 be positive, i.e., the following inequality must hold:
1 + 4 (   1) > : (A2)
When (A2) holds, the roots Ya, Yb of 	(Y ) = 0 are:
Ya;b =
Rh
2
0@1  

  2


s
1  

  2
2
  4
1A :
Both roots are positive (negative) if 1 2 > (<). Combined with inequality (A2), this
means that 	(Y ) changes signs over (0;1) if and only if
2 +
p
 < 1: (A3)
	(Y ) is negative for Y 2 (Ya; Yb) ; and positive for Y 2 (0; Ya)[(Yb;1). Since Y = r1 1=1 ,
this means that 	(Y ) is negative for intermediate values of r1 and positive otherwise. Using
(11) again, this in turn implies that, provided (A3) holds, 1 (B1) is strictly increasing for
intermediate values of B1 and strictly decreasing otherwise. When (A3) does not hold, then
	(Y ) is non-negative and 1 (B1) is decreasing or at over (0;1) :
Proof of proposition 2
Comparing equations (6) and (10), we have that P j1 > P
F
1 , j = l; h; if and only if
r1(B
j
1) < 1=; j = l; h:
In equilibrium, 1(B
j
1) = 1=: Then, substituting (14) into the above inequality, we nd
that P j1 > P
F
1 if and only if X
j
S1=B
j
1 > 0; which is always true whether j = l or h.
Turning to the second inequality in this proposition, rst use 1(B
j
1) = 1=; together
with equations (11) and (12), to rewrite Bj1 as follows:
Bj1 = r1(B
j
1)f
0 1  r1(Bj1)+ Rh; j = l; h:
Comparing the latter equation with (7), we nd that Bj1 < B
F
1 if, and only if,
r1(B
j
1)f
0 1  r1(Bj1) < (1=) f 0 1 (1=) ; j = l; h:
r1f
0 1 (r1) falls with r1 since f 0 1 (r1)+r1f 0 10 (r1) = XS1+f 0 (XS1) =f 00 (XS1) is negative
by assumption (1). Thus, r1f 0 1 (r1) < (1=) f 0 1 (1=) if and only if r1(B
j
1) > 1=; j = l; h,
which is necessarily true from (12) and the fact that 1(B
j
1) = 1=.
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